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Abstract: In his paper ‘Nietzsche, Tristan, and the Rehabilitation of Erotic Distance’ 
Joseph D. Kuzma identifies two seemingly opposed erotic ideals in Wagner’s Tristan 
and Isolde. He claims that Nietzsche applauded the first and sought to dispense with 
the second, and that this was his solution to the problem of nihilism. I argue that this 
‘solution’ is as ill-defined as the ideals it involves, and that it either consigns us to hell 
or offers a terminological variant upon theism. I rescue Schopenhauer from some 
familiar charges and make a link with Simone Weil’s reflections upon love’s 
impossibility.   
 
Introduction 
In his ‘Nietzsche, Tristan, and the Rehabilitation of Erotic Distance’,1 Joseph D. 
Kuzma identifies two seemingly opposed erotic ideals in Wagner’s Tristan and 
Isolde.2 The first, courtly, ideal involves ‘love of and from a distance’. It eschews the 
very idea of satisfaction, involves a desire for endless desire, and is predicated upon 
absence rather than presence. The second ideal – to be found in the likes of Plato and 
Schopenhauer – involves a desire to eradicate distance and absence so as to attain the 
kind of satisfaction to which the first ideal remains opposed. Ultimately, however, it is 
a desire for death. Kuzma argues that the presence of both of these ideals in Tristan is 
problematic, and that Nietzsche sought to applaud the first, dispense with the second, 
and in this way to offer a possible solution to the problem of nihilism: Nietzsche’s 
aim was to ‘[f]orge an alternative conception of erotic desire – a conception no longer 
subordinated to the pursuit of fusional reconciliation but rather linked to the eternal 
return and the unconditional affirmation of distance itself’.3 Kuzma notes a similar 
theme and interest in Robert Pippin, who suggests that the ‘the possibility of…an 
unrequited love, especially the possibility of sustaining it, turns out to one of the best 
images for the question Nietzsche wants to ask about nihilism…some form of erotic 
longing might yet remain tenable – even in the perpetual absence of all satisfaction’.4  
 The possibility will be greeted with either rapture or horror, depending upon 
how one interprets the kinds of longing and satisfaction at issue. The interpretations 
are various, for the relevant ideals are ill-defined as they stand, as is the question of 
how they are to be related and appraised. I shall argue that Wagner’s tendency to play 
them off against each other is understandable, and that it is only within the context of 
such a play off that we arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem with which 
Nietzsche is grappling, albeit a solution that challenges the framework within which 
this problem is usually articulated.     
 
A preliminary gloss of the two ideals and Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde 
The first erotic ideal has its origin in the tradition of courtly romance. This tradition 
operated outside the economy of institutionalized marriage, which latter ‘had little to 
do with romantic fulfilment and even less to do with the mystical communion of 
souls’.5 This ‘apparent marginalization of the erotic’ demanded to be rectified, and 
there was fabricated ‘a new erotic ideal which was predicated on the glorification of 
“a love which is beyond all bounds”’. 6 It ‘replaced the pursuit of Christian virtue with 
the deification of yearning itself’, and, ‘unlike Christian love, with its model of 
charity towards one’s neighbour’, ‘recognized only love of and from a distance’.7 The 
protagonist of this courtly drama ‘despite his frequent insistence to the contrary, seeks 
neither the full possession of a desired object nor the realization of some felicitous 
end but rather only the unrelenting intensification of desire itself’. Hence, ‘[i]t is my 
desire that I desire, and the loved being is no more than its tool’.8 The upshot is that 
‘everything that leads to the augmentation of erotic longing is sought by the courtly 
knight as if it were an end in itself, while everything that diminishes this longing, 
especially the act of coitus, is carefully avoided’.9 It is for this reason that the courtly 
lover endeavours ‘to sustain and prolong the courtship as long as possible, even 
indefinitely, expending his energy and resources but always “without an end in 
sight…without orgasm”’.10 It follows that courtly romance ‘opposes itself to the 
satisfaction of erotic loving as much as to matrimony’, 11and this is why we find in 
such tales ‘a seemingly endless accumulation of obstacles and crises, all of which 
serve to keep the amorous pair indefinitely separated’. As Denis De Rougemont put it: 
‘[o]bstruction is what passion really wants – its true object’. 12  
 The second erotic ideal is aimed towards consummation and ‘the attainment of 
blissful release’,13 and it involves a ‘deep yearning for the thing-in-itself and the 
eternal gloire of abiding presence’.14 However, it seems to point equally in the 
direction of an absence, for the desired blissful release is said to be equivalent to a 
‘blissful nothingness’ – an ‘eternal repose’ the desire for which gives expression to 
the will to nothingness.15 Hence Tristan and Isolde ‘end up seduced by the promise of 
eternal repose and fulfilment, preferring to will even nothingness rather than endure 
the indefinite prolongation of what Proust describes as the “incurable malady” of 
erotic love’.16   
 Tristan and Isolde may well be seduced in this direction, but Wagner’s 
treatment of their story is said to give equal expression to the first erotic ideal, the 
upshot being that its audience is offered two separate tales: 
 
[o]ne culminating in presence, satiety, and release and another in which the 
tireless movement of courtly deferral remains utterly unvanquished. It is a work 
that pushes the longing for amorous proximity and consummation to its furthest 
point possible while also offering us at the same time an account of absolute and 
unrelenting erotic forbearance. 17 
 
The second tale – the one involving a tireless movement of courtly deferral – is 
expressed in the lovers’ predicament. To return to the previous characterization of the 
relevant erotic ideal, there is ‘a seemingly endless accumulation of obstacles and 
crises, all of which serve to keep the amorous pair indefinitely separated’. It is for this 
reason that the work has been considered an ‘archetypal exemplification of courtly 
romance’.18 Nevertheless, and no doubt because there is a competing ideal at work, 
the lovers experience their predicament with anguish rather than pleasure – they are 
hopelessly ensnared in the relevant predicament, and seek the one thing they cannot 
have, namely, erotic fulfilment and the elimination of the distance which stands in its 
way. Hence: ‘Destined for me, lost to me’, ‘How long apart! How far apart so long!’, 
‘Blessed nearness, tedious distance!’ 19  
 Questions and clarifications 
The initial characterization we are given of the first erotic ideal suggests that it is to be 
applauded. After all, it has its origin in a tradition which repairs the marginalization of 
the erotic, there is the promise of romantic fulfilment, and even a mystical 
communion of souls. The idea that the love it involves is ‘beyond all bounds’ suggests 
that it is unlimited in the sense that it is without end. The further claim that it replaces 
the Christian pursuit of virtue with ‘the deification of yearning itself’ suggests that the 
yearning which is so deified is to be set against the love one has towards one’s 
neighbour. Perhaps we are to suppose that Christian love is not boundless in the 
relevant sense. It is unclear where the deification of yearning leaves the ideas of 
romantic fulfilment and a mystical communion of souls, but the idea that such 
yearning is directed towards itself - ‘it is my desire that I desire’ –  need not imply 
that these putative aims have been abandoned. After all, the desire I desire could be 
directed towards a significant other, and it remains open that its pursuit involves a 
form of communion which brings fulfilment. 
 We are told that the desire for desire involves ‘love of and from a distance’. 
However, these loves are not equivalent, nor are they inevitably connected. One can 
love from a distance without loving distance itself, when, for example, one’s love 
cannot, but longs to, speak its name. In such a scenario, and other things being equal, 
there is no obvious reason for doubting the lover’s sincerity when she tells us that it is 
her beloved she desires, although there is a question about what it could mean to talk 
of wanting the beloved’s ‘full possession’ in this context, and whether these terms of 
description are remotely appropriate.  
The lover of distance need not love anybody from a distance, and the picture 
we have been given suggests that contact with others, and indeed, love for them, is to 
be avoided. In two ways: first, this ‘distance love’ stands opposed to Christian love, 
eschewing the model of charity towards one’s neighbour; second, it involves a desire 
for desire – more specifically, its unrelenting intensification - and we are told that the 
desired object comes into the equation, if at all, only at an instrumental level – ‘it is 
my desire that I desire, and the loved being is no more than its tool’. This ‘loved 
being’ – presumably the object of erotic rather than Christian love - is likewise to be 
kept at a distance, her purely instrumental role suggesting that she is no such thing.  
 Kuzma opposes ‘distance love’ to a love which culminates in ‘presence, 
satiety, and release’. This suggests that distance love remains unsatisfied, although 
there is a question about what this really means, and whether it is a good thing or a 
bad thing. Doubts on the first score arise when we ask whether there could be 
satisfaction in the pursuit of endless, intensifying desire. Intuitively yes, for it would 
be difficult otherwise to see what could motivate such an aim. Yet we know that 
Kuzma has an interest in the question of whether there could be a form of erotic 
longing which remains tenable ‘even in the perpetual absence of all satisfaction’. 
Perhaps the idea is not that the envisaged form of erotic longing brings no satisfaction 
at all, but, rather, that the satisfaction it affords is of a different order from that of the 
love to which distance love is opposed. Christian love is distinguished from distance 
love on the ground that it takes as its object a person in need. So it involves ‘presence’ 
to this degree at least, but it would be odd to say that it culminates in presence, at least 
in so far as we are concerned with the presence of someone in need. It sounds equally 
odd to say of such a relationship that it brings satiety and release, although one might 
suppose that Christian love, to the extent that it orients the lover towards God, carries 
an implicit reference to such notions. That is to say that it culminates in ‘presence, 
satiety, and release’ in the sense that this is what we get when we come face-to-face 
with God.  
 These notions are a clear part and parcel of the love which defines the second 
erotic ideal, and we are offered various, potentially conflicting, conceptions of the 
satisfaction at issue. The lover desires ‘full possession of the desired object’, the 
realization of a ‘felicitous end’ which will bring ‘blissful release’, ‘fusional 
reconciliation’, ‘amorous proximity and consummation’, the ‘thing-in-itself and the 
eternal gloire of abiding presence’, ‘blissful nothingness’. The idea that the lover 
desires full possession of the desired object can be variously interpreted, depending 
upon how the notion of possession is interpreted and what kind of object is at issue. It 
carries connotations of control and conquest, but these become less compelling if, say, 
the desired object is goodness. After all, there is nothing remotely controlling about 
wanting to possess goodness if this means simply that one wants to be good. This is 
not to deny that there are readings which favour the opposing interpretation - one 
thinks of the desire to make goodness in one’s own preferred image.  
Wanting to possess a person seems very different from wanting to possess a 
quality, for there is no immediate implication that one wants to be that person. Indeed, 
if ‘possession’ is understood in the aforementioned ‘controlling’ sense, then it seems 
more appropriate to say that it goes the other way round – that one wants to take over 
the other person so that they are or do what one wants them to be or do. Is this how 
we are to interpret the claim that the lover desires ‘full possession of the desired 
object’? Certainly there are lovers who desire this kind of control, although we might 
hesitate to call them lovers, except in so far as we are using the term in the misleading 
sense at issue when it is said that one’s beloved is a mere tool.  
The idea that the lovers in question desire ‘fusional reconciliation’ seems a far 
cry from any controlling tendencies on their parts. It suggests also that talk of wanting 
to be or to become the beloved is not so wide of the mark after all. Witness Tristan 
and Isolde: ‘Tristan you/I Isolde/No longer Tristan/You Isolde/Tristan I/No longer 
Isolde!/Un-named/Free from parting/New perception/New enkindling/self-
knowing/warmly glowing heart/love’s utmost joy!’20 These terms of description are 
commonplace in the literary and philosophical tradition. As Lucretius once said, it is 
the desire of lovers ‘to penetrate and pass with body entire into body’.21 Roger 
Scruton interprets this to mean that lovers seek to abolish ‘the separateness that 
underlies desire’, and responds that ‘it is not this that we seek in desire, even if what 
we seek may be evocatively described in these terms’.22 His grounds for dismissal are 
not spelled out, but we are to suppose perhaps that there is something paradoxical to 
the idea that lovers desire to be without desire. The possibility of there being a fusion 
in which desire is preserved is not considered.   
Simone Weil has more sympathy for Lucretius’ position, taking him to have 
identified the fact that love ‘cannot attain its desire in this world’.23 Love, she tells us: 
 
is the need to emerge from what the Hindus call the state of duality, the 
separation between subject and object; to imitate the Trinity, where lover and 
beloved form but a single entity, where the lover, by the same act, creates, 
knows and loves the beloved who is himself. 24 
 
She claims also that ‘[w]hen Lucretius reproaches love with containing this element 
of impossibility which is essential to it, what he doesn’t understand is that therein lies 
precisely the principle of its providential design’. Hence: ‘it is the fact of impossibility 
which leads to God’. It does so because such love ‘is forced to climb upward toward 
what lies above it, on the other side of the sky’.25  
We are returned to the idea of fusional reconciliation, albeit with some 
significant modifications. First, and as per Lucretius, the desire for such reconciliation 
is common to all erotic lovers and not just those driven by Kuzma’s second erotic 
ideal; second, and as per Lucretius and Scruton, this desire cannot be satisfied; third, 
it follows that there is an element of impossibility which is essential to love; and 
finally, this element somehow leads us to God. We are to suppose that reconciliation 
with God repairs the duality from which we ‘need to emerge’, although the Trinitarian 
model Weil utilizes in this context brings a significant complication. After all, the 
lover and beloved within the Trinity form a single entity whilst also being separate.  
There lurks a providential design in Kuzma’s claim that pursuers of the second 
erotic ideal seek ‘the eternal gloire of abiding presence’. We are told also, however, 
that such an aim presupposes a desire for ‘eternal repose and fulfilment’ which, in 
turn, gives expression to the will for nothingness.26 The desire for eternal repose and 
fulfilment seems perfectly reasonable at one level, even more so if the alternative is 
‘the indefinite prolongation of what Proust describes as the “incurable malady” of 
erotic love’. However, there is malady and malady, and we cannot assume that erotic 
love’s incurable malady is equivalent to endless and unrelenting suffering. Perhaps if 
it were, then nothingness would, indeed, be preferable. Second, however, we can ask 
what the justification is for equating eternal repose and fulfilment with nothingness. 
The link is immediate if these things are equivalent to death, and there is motive for 
insisting upon this equivalence once the word ‘eternal’ is brought into the equation. 
After all, how could a state of eternal repose or fulfilment be anything other than 
death? It is surely not this that we seek in desire. Weil’s position offers a potential 
response to this complaint, assuming that it makes sense to suppose that we can be 
reconciled with God. However, there is a question about what such reconciliation 
could mean, and where it leaves our human loves, and indeed, lives.      
Weil’s conception of fusional reconciliation suggests a way of accommodating 
the distinctness of the relevant fused beings, and if, as Scruton suggests, it is 
separateness that underlies desire, then the model concedes equally to the first erotic 
ideal. The concession is evident already in the claim that love involves an essential 
element of impossibility, and this element is further elaborated in a passage which 
returns us to the theme of courtly love. Hence:  
 
It is because homosexual love is impossible, since carrying it into execution 
constitutes too great a defilement, that the Greeks placed it on so high a 
level…In the moral customs of that society, the love between men and women 
encountered insufficient obstacles. Later on Christianity, and still more the 
chaste moral habits the Germans brought with them turned the love between a 
man and a woman into something impossible. Thenceforth, the Platonic form of 
homosexual love became knightly and courtly love. 27    
 
The impossibility at issue here is different from that operative when two lovers 
strive to be literally one. For homosexual and courtly love are said to be impossible in 
the sense that there are moral and social obstacles which prevent the lovers from 
‘coming together’ in the more intuitive sense of that expression. So we have love from 
a distance in the sense that the love is not, as Weil puts it, ‘carr[ied] into execution’.28 
Do we have a love of distance? Not if this means that the lovers love the distance 
between them, for they desire to be together. At least, this is the natural way of 
reading Weil’s version of their predicament. She seems to be suggesting, however, 
that the distance between them - which prevents them from trying to unite in the 
metaphysically impossible sense - puts them in a better position to relate to God. It is 
unclear whether she thinks that relating to God is an alternative to loving another 
human being erotically, but we are encouraged to suppose that it is an alternative to 
giving physical expression to that love, and a superior alternative at that.  
Elsewhere Weil tells us that we relate to God at the level of neighbourly 
love.29 Another clear sense in which her position stands opposed to Kuzma’s distance 
love, for this latter, he claims, ‘‘replaced the pursuit of Christian virtue with the 
deification of yearning itself’, and, ‘unlike Christian love, with its model of charity 
towards one’s neighbour’, ‘recognized only love of and from a distance’. On Weil’s 
position then we love God from a distance in the sense that we love Him by loving 
others. She claims further that, in loving God in this way, we are partaking in His life. 
It is in this context that she talks of our ‘imitat[ing] the descending movement of God 
so as to turn ourselves towards the world’, going so far as to claim that, in such a 
scenario, God is ‘on the side of the subject’ – He sees the things that we see.30 
Loving God from a distance in this sense brings him as close to home as could 
be. We are to suppose that, in such a context, lover and beloved ‘form but a single 
entity’, and that this is what it means to carry our love for God ‘into execution’. But 
what does this have to do with the distance love of the star-crossed lovers – a distance 
which serves as an obstacle to carrying their love into execution? Weil seems to be 
suggesting that this ‘impossibility’ leads them to God. That is to say that the fact that 
they cannot carry their love into execution means that they can execute their love for 
God. 
If this is right, then we are given a clear sense in which erotic love - or at least 
its physical expression – is to be transcended, and it will be remembered that Kuzma’s 
lover of distance stands similarly opposed to such expression on the ground that 
abstention offers the only way of satisfying his desire for the ‘unrelenting 
intensification of desire itself’. Thus, we are told that everything that diminishes erotic 
longing, ‘especially the act of coitus, is carefully avoided’, and that such a lover 
endeavours ‘to sustain and prolong the courtship as long as possible, even 
indefinitely, expending his energy and resources but always “without an end in 
sight…without orgasm”’.31   
Coitus leading to orgasm can occur outside the context of erotic love, when, 
for example, we are concerned with sex with an insignificant other for the purposes of 
sexual release. This distinction is fudged with the claim that the act of coitus 
diminishes erotic longing, for it does no such thing if this is taken to mean that it 
diminishes one’s desire for the beloved. What it diminishes is the desire for sex – 
temporarily at least, and there is a difference between desiring sex and desiring one’s 
beloved, even if desiring one’s beloved involves a desire to have sexual contact with 
her.  
The idea that the lover of distance seeks to prolong the courtship as long as 
possible ‘without an end in sight, without orgasm’ could be read as an expression of 
her interest in the beloved – she’s not just in it for the sex. We are told, however, that 
she’s in it for the desire – or more accurately, its unrelenting intensification - where 
this is intended to be incompatible with the possibility of desiring the beloved – ‘it is 
my desire that I desire and the loved being is merely its tool’. The rather significant 
caveat is that the lover will tend to challenge this version of events, claiming to the 
contrary that what she really wants is ‘full possession of a desired object’ or the 
‘realization of some felicitous end’. The sincerity of the lover is surely to be granted 
in some such scenarios, although it should be clear from what has been said that the 
meaning of these alternative aims is entirely unclear – perhaps she thinks that she 
wants a sex slave or maybe this talk of possession is just a misleading way of 
capturing her unrelenting desire.   
The lover’s desire for desire need not be incompatible with her desiring the 
beloved, for the desire she desires might be essentially a desire for her beloved. We 
are told, however, that the beloved’s role is purely instrumental - a mere tool for 
intensifying the lover’s desire.  De Rougemont seems to have some such scenario in 
mind when he says of Tristan and Isolde that they ‘do not love each other…What they 
love is love and being in love…Their need of one another is in order to be aflame, and 
they do not need one another as they are. What they need is not one another’s 
presence, but one another’s absence’.32 Hence the claim that what passion really 
wants – its true object – is obstruction. The situation offers a reversal of that of Weil’s 
star-crossed lovers – they love from a distance without loving distance itself - and 
gives a clear enough sense of what it could mean to use the beloved as a tool for 
generating the desired desire. After all, ‘their need of one another is in order to be 
aflame, and they do not need one another as they are’.  
We have an example of what it could mean to deify yearning. Yearning is 
more important than anything or anyone else, and the lover’s desire for yearning 
imposes a distance between herself and the world which guarantees that she remains 
satisfied in this respect. The enterprise is hedonistic in one obvious sense, but De 
Rougemont claims also that it involves a desire for death. It is left unclear why the 
desire for desire should will its destruction in this way.33 After all, it is one thing to 
say of such a lover that she wants to be apart from her beloved for the purposes of 
enjoying her own private yearning, and another to say that she wants death, not least 
because death provides the ultimate guarantee that her desire for desire will be 
thwarted. We can note, however, that De Rougemont’s prototype for this seemingly 
self-defeating enterprise is Tristan and Isolde, and it is familiar from Kuzma that there 
is a tension in this work which can be traced back to the two opposing erotic ideals it 
embodies – one heralding desire, the other heralding death. It is equally familiar that 
Kuzma seeks to dispel this tension by dispensing with the second ideal, his aim being 
to link this move to Nietzsche’s solution to the problem of nihilism. Our findings 
suggest that this oppositional framework is too simplistic, and that there is a real 
question to be asked about what these ideals are and how they relate. We must 
consider now what this means for the putative problem of nihilism and its solution.  
 
Nihilism  
Nihilism is as ill-defined as the ideals we have sought to clarify, but Kuzma, 
following Pippin, takes it to be inextricably linked to the idea that the ultimate goal of 
desire is death.34 Pippin himself claims that the problem of nihilism consists in ‘a 
failure of desire, the flickering out of some erotic flame’,35 and he points us towards 
some of the images which are used by Nietzsche to convey this condition: ‘bows that 
have lost their tension, human archers who have lost sight of a goal, an enervating 
contentment…a simple fatigue, the “weariness of man,” and so forth’.36 We have 
been told already that Nietzsche’s proposed solution is to introduce an alternative 
conception of erotic desire which is ‘no longer subordinated to the pursuit of fusional 
reconciliation but rather linked to the eternal return and the unconditional affirmation 
of distance itself’. The further claim is that we are concerned here with the possibility 
of sustaining a form of erotic longing ‘even in the perpetual absence of all 
satisfaction’. We are to suppose that this longing – which is described also as a form 
of unrequited love - will reignite the lost ‘erotic flame’ to bring desire (and hence life) 
back into the human picture.   
 So the problem to which this solution is proposed involves a failure of desire, 
where this means not simply a failure to form a particular desire, but a failure to 
desire anything at all. To revert to Pippin’s metaphor, we are concerned with the 
‘flickering out of some erotic flame’. It is unclear whose failed desire we are talking 
about here, but context suggests that some of Nietzsche’s contemporaries are to be 
implicated, and that this failure has something to do with their pursuit of the second 
erotic ideal, which latter is the defining feature of nihilism. It follows that we can 
solve the problem of nihilism only by dispensing with the offending ideal and 
replacing it with an alternative which will re-introduce and sustain the desire which 
has somehow been lost.  
 The failure of desire at issue arises when the ultimate goal of desire is death. 
But what does this mean? Perhaps we are concerned with one who desires death 
above everything else - a rather poignant reversal of Sartre’s claim that man, 
fundamentally, is the desire to be God.37 But in what sense does this involve a failure 
of desire? And who is to be implicated in this respect? Given the images used by 
Nietzsche to capture the offending condition, we are to suppose that this failure is 
expressed in a certain world-weariness and lack of motivation. And perhaps someone 
who desires death above all else will be indifferent to the world in this sense, although 
it would be misleading to say that she is like an archer who has lost sight of a goal, or, 
indeed, that she has an enervating contentment.  
 The picture is more complex than this initial characterization suggests, for 
what really motivates in this context is the desire for ultimate fulfilment, the belief 
connecting this with the desire for death being that ultimate fulfilment requires death. 
This helps to make better sense of the idea that we are concerned with a condition 
which is prevalent enough to warrant diagnosis, for we all desire fulfilment, and even 
the most Godless anti-metaphysician can allow that the fulfilment we desire is 
‘ultimate’ in some sense of that term. But what is the connection between ultimate 
fulfilment and death? Is the idea that ultimate fulfilment is to be found in death? 
Seemingly not, for the belief in question is that ‘the path to ultimate fulfilment leads 
ineluctably through the gates of death and renunciation’, 38 the implication being that 
death is a mere parenthesis. Kuzma finds such a belief in Schopenhauer, offering us 
the following summary of his soteriological message:  
 
[o]ne must turn away from life itself and pursue the sheer mortification of the 
will. The path to ultimate fulfilment leads ineluctably through the gates of death 
and renunciation. Death, in other words, becomes the ultimate goal of all 
desire’. 39 
 
 This is a misleading characterization of Schopenhauer’s position for various 
reasons. First, he does not think that we can pursue the sheer mortification of the will 
on the ground that this would be self-defeating – we would be willing not to will.40 
Second, although the life he implores us to turn away from is a life of will/desire, he 
believes that there is more to life than the pursuit of desire, and that such a pursuit can 
bring no genuine fulfilment. This is what he says: 
 
[s]o long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to 
the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the 
subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace…without peace 
and calm, true well-being is absolutely impossible. 41 
 
And: 
 
Absolutely every human life continues to flow on between willing and 
attainment. Of its nature the wish is pain; attainment quickly begets satiety. The 
goal was only apparent; possession takes away its charm. The wish, the need, 
appears again on the scene under a new form; if it does not, then dreariness, 
emptiness, and boredom follow, the struggle against which is just as painful as 
is that against want.42 
  
The result is that: 
 
The subject of willing is constantly lying on the revolving wheel of Ixion, is 
always drawing water in the sieve of the Danaids, and is the eternally thirsting 
Tantalus. 43 
 
 Schopenhauer is operating with a version of the claim that desire is 
impossible. It is impossible in the sense that its pursuit can only ever bring 
suffering and dissatisfaction. I strive for something (suffering), and either my 
desire remains unsatisfied (suffering) or I get what I want. If I get what I want then 
there is satisfaction and pleasure, but this pleasure is short-lived and quickly gives 
rise to boredom (itself a form of suffering), and then more willing (suffering). 
Alternatively, if I don’t get what I want then I may continue to strive for it 
(suffering), or fix upon another goal (suffering) which, if attained, will give way to 
boredom, and then more willing, and so on, and on, forever. It is in this sense that 
the desiring being is the eternally thirsting Tantalus. Schopenhauer claims further 
that, qua desiring being, ‘man is a wolf for man’44, and that: 
 
[h]e who keeps this last fact clearly in view beholds the world as a hell, 
surpassing that of Dante by the fact that one man must be the devil of another. 45 
 
 This is all rather interesting when taken in the Nietzschean context in which 
Schopenhauer’s position has been introduced, for we have been encouraged to 
suppose that his philosophy is the embodiment of nihilism, that it helps to motivate a 
failure of desire, and that this attitude stands opposed to life and all that really matters. 
Schopenhauer does indeed stand opposed to desire, but this is because he believes that 
its pursuit can bring no genuine fulfilment. It fails on this score not simply because 
the satisfaction afforded is merely temporary, but because such a pursuit is purely 
self-serving. The implication here is that all desires are I-desires in Bernard Williams’ 
sense, and that genuine fulfilment requires that this egoistic stance be transcended.  
I have noted already that Schopenhauer denies that we pursue the 
mortification of the will if this is intended to imply that such a ‘change in the subject’ 
proceeds from the will we are seeking to transcend. So the change cannot ‘rest with 
us’ if this means that the egoistic will can will its own destruction.46 However, 
Schopenhauer talks of our ‘severing’ the bonds of willing that tie us to the world, 
referring to a voluntary renunciation on our part.47 This suggests that our motivational 
make-up extends beyond egoistic will/desire, there being no immediate implication 
that a failure of desire in this sense spells death. We can note also that Schopenhauer’s 
description of this renunciation is steeped in religious imagery. We are said to be 
concerned with ‘an effect of grace,48 and in the context of describing how difficult it 
is to resist the pull of egoism, he cites Jesus’ claim that ‘[i]t is easier for a camel to go 
through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God’.49 
He makes it clear also that the Kingdom in question is one in which, to repeat the 
words of Weil, we shall have emerged ‘from what the Hindus call the state of duality, 
the separation between subject and object’, and although Schopenhauer does not go so 
far as to talk of our imitating the Trinity, he is quite happy to say of ‘the good man’ 
that he ‘draws all things up to God, to the source whence first they came’.50   
Thus far, I have suggested that a failure of desire need be nothing more 
innocuous than a description of what we have when egoistic desires no longer hold 
exclusive dominion. As Schopenhauer puts it, they are deprived of their sting’51 so 
that our motivations extend beyond ‘particular things and their relation to [one’s] 
own person’ to encompass disinterested love and self-sacrifice. 52 Are we to say of 
such a person that she suffers from an enervating contentment or weariness? Or 
resembles an archer without a goal? Schopenhauer agrees that world-weariness or 
boredom is a lamentable condition, and he agrees also that it occurs when the will 
is held in abeyance. However, he believes that this kind of ‘failure’ is not genuine, 
and that will remains in the background nonetheless: it involves an implicit 
second-order willing – the will to will with nothing to will.53 As he sees it then, 
boredom is part and parcel of an existence which is desire-driven in the offending 
sense, and does not therefore constitute a state in which the will is truly 
disengaged. The implication here is that there is a kind of disengagement (or 
‘failure’ to use this rather loaded term) which paves the way to genuine fulfilment. 
We are to suppose also that one can be motivated in this direction, the implication 
being that it is quite inappropriate to describe such a person as an archer without a 
goal.   
 Schopenhauer is moving towards a form of religious asceticism which has 
much in common with that of Simone Weil, and although he can be rescued from 
some of the Nietzschean charges which are thrown his way, one is left with a sense 
that the mystical state of consciousness towards which he is gesturing, even if not 
tantamount to blank non-existence, is in danger of being inimical to life itself, even 
once the notion of life has been rescued from a narrow egoistic interpretation. This 
need not be a devastating problem, for Schopenhauer makes it clear that the 
mystical path is not for everyone. Nevertheless, it sometimes seems as if anything 
less will simply re-open the gates to an unbridled egoism. Take, for example, his 
conception of erotic longing. Schopenhauer objects that this is just one more 
egoistic enterprise in which ‘the notion of an endless bliss’ is associated with ‘the 
possession of a particular woman’,54 and he describes lovers as ‘traitors who 
secretly strive to perpetuate the whole trouble and toil that would otherwise come 
rapidly to an end’. 55 There is no room for erotic love in this scheme of things, and 
it is implied that sexual activity is to be avoided – understandably so if it conforms 
to the structure of willing, and if that structure is as hellish as we have been led to 
suppose. Schopenhauer’s distaste for sexual activity suggests that he is not seeking 
to eliminate the distance between lovers in this sense. However, this is not because 
he believes that abstention will intensify desire. On the contrary, we are to suppose 
that it will have the opposite effect by bringing about a similar ‘change in the 
subject’ to that which occurs in a non-sexual context when desires are deprived of 
their sting. It is at this point that ‘the whole trouble and toil’ will seem hardly 
worth the bother, and it is at this point that we might begin to wonder whether the 
nihilistic label is not so inappropriate after all.  
  
A Nietzschean response 
Kuzma tells us that: 
 
[a]gainst the many thinkers, poets, and philosophers who since the dawning of 
Western thought had raised the affirmation of fusional reconciliation to the 
highest summit of erotic life, Nietzsche would ultimately seek to affirm 
something even more extreme, “something higher than any reconciliation.” 
 
He continues: 
 
But what, we might ask, could be more extreme than a desire for death and 
reconciliation? Nietzsche’s answer: the Dionysian longing for a ‘deep, deep 
Eternity’…bereft of either release or consummation. To desire eternity in the 
absence of every end and object – would this not be to subject eroticism to a 
fundamental reorientation, away from the pursuit of consummatory fulfilment 
and toward an unprecedented valorization of distance itself? 56  
 
It should be clear from what has been said that the notion of fusional 
reconciliation admits of several interpretations, and that it is not unambiguously 
affirmed by Schopenhauer. Likewise, we have questioned the assumption that he is 
affirming a desire for death. Indeed, it seems more appropriate to describe his own 
position as one which involves a desire for ‘deep, deep Eternity’ - ‘bereft of either 
release or consummation’ and ‘in the absence of every end and object’ in the sense 
that the longing in question transcends the structure of willing.  
 Thus far Nietzsche sits rather comfortably in the mystic’s camp – an 
impression which is further consolidated with some of the quotations used by 
Kuzma to illustrate his position. So, for example, he cites the following words 
from Thus Spoke Zarathustra: ‘Higher than love of the nearest is love of the 
farthest’57 – hardly a love of distance, but rather clearly a love from a distance 
whose object cries out for a religious interpretation. Witness the following: 
 
To think of that which is truly most distant, in other words, demands of us that 
we conceive of something even further away than every object of possible 
acquisition. It demands of us that we attempt to think of that which remains 
incapable, by necessity, from of ever being grasped – not simply by a contingent 
incapacity on the lover’s part or by some provision of amorous conduct but 
rather of the object’s sheer incommensurability with any form of presence. 58   
 
This could be Weil talking about God or Schopenhauer talking about the thing-in-
itself. Are we to suppose then that Nietzsche is committed to the second erotic 
ideal after all? Or would it be more appropriate to say that the distinction between 
the two ideals has been compromised? After all, the ‘distance love’ at issue here is 
supposedly desire-involving, and irreducibly so.    
 Kuzma then asks ‘what could possibly remain for us to love and to desire 
when every object, every other, and every end has been disqualified or rendered 
vain?’59 This is similar to the question thrown at Schopenhauer by those who 
complain that his eschatology is nihilism,60 and what has been said so far on 
Nietzsche’s behalf suggests that a mystical response would not be entirely 
inappropriate in this case too. We are told, however, that, for Nietzsche, to love 
that which is truly furthest: 
 
[i]s to love nothing less than the vast and illimitable circuit of circuits itself – 
the ring of eternity that transforms the infinity of time into a spiralling pathway 
bereft of either beginning or completion…To love that which is most distant, in 
other words, is to love distance itself’.61    
 
The meaning of this is unclear, but Kuzma refers us to some of the language 
deployed by Nietzsche when writing about Wagner’s Tristan, in particular, his 
claim that the love in question involves a ‘voluptuousness of hell’, and a ‘weird 
and sweet infinity’. The word ‘voluptuousness’ is said to evoke ‘a kind of 
enchantment or attraction’ which ‘incites desire while leaving it permanently 
unsatisfied’, this because ‘all voluptuousness is inspired by things half-concealed’, 
and we are concerned with ‘that which entices one with a promise but that leaves 
its fulfilment unceasingly deferred’. 62 Nothing too hellish in any of this, and the 
religious connotations suggest that we are moving, rather, in the direction of 
heaven. We are then told that, in his Tristan, Wagner converts this endlessness into 
a ‘voluptuousness of hell’ by making the relevant desire something ‘to renounce, to 
denigrate, to curse’.63 This because he ‘had sensed the endlessness of yearning as 
humanity’s most profound damnation and had turned against life on account of 
it’.64 By contrast, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: 
 
[c]omes to summon a truly unprecedented affirmation in the very face of this 
futility, allowing Nietzsche to juxtapose, in a most stunning manner, the 
Tristanian longing for death and consummation with a longing still more 
provocative and extreme, a Dionysian longing for deep eternity bereft of either 
consummation or release.65  
  
It is in this way that erotic desire is reconceptualized ‘outside the restricted 
economy of teleological constraint, outside any reference to fusional or 
consummatory fantasy’ so that we are left with: 
 
[t]he notion of an endless, objectless, desire – the trauma of eternal 
recommencement that consigns every yearning to dissatisfaction and every love 
to failure. This is what the denouement to Wagner’s opera so visibly attempts to 
conceal and to subdue. And it is this, precisely that Nietzsche is then attempting 
to reassert so affirmatively at the very heart of his own thought. To love most 
fully, as Nietzsche would suggest to us, is to love without fulfilment. It is to 
discern, in those voluptuous distances of an endless circuit, the scintillating 
intimations of an unprecedented affirmation, an unprecedented conception of 
what it means to live – and to love. 66  
 
6. Conclusions 
Let us return to the initial gloss we were given of Nietzsche’s solution to the 
problem of nihilism, namely, that it concerns ‘the possibility of…an unrequited 
love, especially the possibility of sustaining it…even in the perpetual absence of all 
satisfaction’. This unrequited love is either humanity’s most profound damnation 
or its best hope of salvation, and Kuzma argues that, in Wagner’s hands, its 
soteriological significance is lost. It is lost because Wagner looks eternity in the 
eye to curse this ‘voluptuousness of hell’, and we are to suppose that this response 
stems from a residual commitment to the erotic ideal which remains within the 
economy of ‘teleological constraint’ and ‘fusional or consummatory fantasy’. The 
question-begging terms help to suggest that Wagner’s response is to be rejected. 
 We are then given a characterization of this unrequited love which makes 
Wagner’s response seem perfectly reasonable, for it is said to involve an endless, 
objectless, desire in which every yearning is consigned to dissatisfaction and every 
love to failure. Yet this is very different from the other half of the picture with 
which we are presented, the focus there being upon the ineffable nature of love’s 
object which ‘attracts’, ‘enchants’, and ‘entices’ without ever giving itself away.
 An endless, objectless, desire in which every yearning is consigned to 
dissatisfaction suggests that its subject really is the eternally thirsting Tantalus, and 
one wonders how this could be a viable model in terms of which to comprehend 
what it means to live and to love. Indeed, we seem to be returned to the futile 
activity of Schopenhauer’s egoistic lover or De Rougemont’s desirer of desire with 
a compelling case for concluding that this is, indeed, humanity’s most profound 
damnation. 67 What would it be to see this as our best hope of salvation? It would 
be to treat the ingredients of the second erotic ideal as products of fantasy so that 
every yearning is consigned to dissatisfaction and every love to failure. One 
wonders what the difference is between this condition and that of nihilism as 
previously defined.  
 The answer, we are to suppose, is that these putative failures of love and 
yearning do not entail a failure of desire, for desire can be sustained in the absence 
of satisfaction and in the light of love’s failure. But what does this really mean? Is 
the idea that our human loves are doomed to failure? That our yearnings are 
consigned to dissatisfaction by virtue of being fated to collapse back upon 
themselves? The idea that our human loves are doomed to failure seems premature 
to say the least, although we can note that, on one interpretation, Nietzsche’s 
principle failing lies in his inability to enter into relationship with others – to 
accept their trust and love.68 What of the idea that our yearnings are fated to 
collapse back upon themselves? Such an image flies in the face of the idea that 
love’s object attracts and entices with a promise which leaves its fulfilment ever 
deferred, and I have noted already that this latter way of thinking offers an 
appropriate and not entirely uncommon way of capturing our relation to God.   
 A theistic framework along these lines is compatible with much of what has 
been said on Nietzsche’s behalf. It offers a way of accommodating an endless 
longing for an object which can never be wholly comprehended yet which 
continues to attract and to entice as we are taken up into its life. A Dionysian 
longing for deep eternity if you like, although it would be equally appropriate to 
talk of our imitating the Trinity. Could this endless longing be viewed as our most 
profound damnation? Only on the assumption that we remain irrevocably sealed 
off from its object, but according to the position at hand this is not the case. On the 
contrary, we are capable of partaking in God’s life, and, if Weil is to be believed, 
of becoming ‘one’ with Him as we turn towards the world and enter into loving 
relations with others. 69 Loving relations with others are eschewed by a proponent 
of the first erotic ideal, and this is so whether we are talking about neighbourly or 
erotic love. We know also that both Weil and Schopenhauer have a tendency to 
play down the significance of eros, even whilst acknowledging that its 
‘impossibility’ carries a providential design. It is no doubt this kind of move which 
leads to the conclusion that such frameworks are nihilistic in the offending sense, 
and we might note that Schopenhauer, in his more extreme ascetic moments, 
suggests that moral relations with others are to be transcended – a further sense in 
which his successor remains true to his roots.  
 Doesn’t it beg the central question at issue to suppose that Nietzsche’s 
problem can be solved by re-introducing God into the equation? After all, hasn’t it 
been shown that such a move is no longer acceptable, and that the problem of 
nihilism is the problem of how there can be life (and desire) after God? First, it has 
not been shown that a theistic framework must be rejected, although there are 
conceptions thereof which make such a conclusion seem inevitable. Second, 
however, it is not ruled out that an atheist can accommodate the possibility of 
desire. All that I have sought to show is that the proposal with which we have been 
concerned on Nietzsche’s behalf – if it is not simply a terminological variant upon 
theism – is inadequate to this explanatory task. It is inadequate because it dispenses 
with the second erotic ideal in favour of the first, and, in so doing, leaves us cut 
loose from anything but ourselves. It is this move which creates the problem with 
which Nietzsche is struggling. The mistake is to suppose that it provides a solution.  
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